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The current mantras under which we operate-no nation-building, no
peacekeeping without a ceasefire, no mission creep, need for early warning,
exit strategy, among others-have been major causes for the failure to deal
effectively with state collapse and deadly conflict in recent years. An
examination of thirty instances of missed opportunities in six cases (Lebanon
in the 1970s-80s, and Somalia, Liberia, Zaire, Haiti and Yugoslavia mainly
throughout the 1990s) shows the need for clearer thinking in analyzing
foreign conflict and responses. Such thinking also needs to be grounded in a
more accurate notion of international relations than that currently provided
by realist notions.
Conflict management is a matter of decision and statesmanship, not of
unequivocal rules of operation. At every step of the way, there are difficult
choices, involving courage, leadership, and risk. It is always safest to follow
the bureaucratic reflex and do nothing, because something might happen to
remove the challenge on its own. Usually, however, things only get worse,
again posing the challenge to choice.
Yet, the cases of missed opportunity cry out at the top of their voices,
with clear lessons to prevent their repetition, many entailing the reversal of
elements of current "wisdom" on intervention and conflict management.
* Inaction is a course of high costs and inefficiency. External actors have
an interest in early action, where costs are lower and options broader. Even
* Schwartz Lecture on Dispute Resolution at The Ohio State University Moritz
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salient solutions to collapse and conflict lose their relevance if not taken in
time.
e Adequate measures are needed from the start, rather than minimal
measures that are the pathway to entrapment. Continuing human losses and
disintegrating regional relations,' brought on by state collapse and deadly
conflict, inevitably compel external powers to become involved at a later
date, when costs are higher and options fewer.
* Promises and predictions need to be backed by threats and warnings.
Unless credible worse alternatives are laid out alongside conflict resolution
efforts, peace will not appear attractive to parties engrossed in conflict.
However, threats feared more by the threatener than by the threatened cannot
be credible.
* In internal conflicts, with multiple parties and indistinct battle lines,
peacekeeping forces need a peace-enforcement mission and rules of
engagement. Waiting for a ceasefire to be fully respected ignores many
opportunities for effective intervention to help make a tentative ceasefire
stick; sending monitors who cannot engage is an exercise in risk and
ineffectiveness.
e Conflict managers need to take the time it takes to finish their job; they
should leave as soon as they can but stay as long as they must. Withdrawal
dates and fixations on exit strategies are invitations to renewed conflict.
Leaving should be the result of a task completed, not the goal of engagement.
* State collapse calls for state- (not nation-) building, or else conflicts
resulting from collapse will continue despite the best efforts of the
international community and local suppliers.
Let us begin this examination first by defining opportunity, then
identifying interest, then developing the early warning/early action problem,
and finally turning to excuses and deeper reasons why opportunities were
missed. Let us remember too that this is not just an "academic" exercise and
that the measures missed were no different (and often less) than those used
later or elsewhere.
II. OPPORTUNITIES
Opportunities are favorable moments for achieving a purpose-a suitable
combination of conditions for accomplishing a goal. The opportune moment
to do something is not just "whenever," but is contextually determined in
relation to the conflict. Interventions require an "entry point" or occasion that
invites foreign action. Need alone does not justify action; there must be some
definable opening for external parties to enter, and if there is not, it must be
created. Opportunities or entry points can be defined by event or by context.
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Events that require or justify a mediatory reaction can be either
scheduled or unscheduled. In a few instances, a scheduled event such as an
election requires a response that could make a major difference in the
subsequent course of actions. Examples include the fraudulent count
announced after the 1985 elections in Liberia,. where American rejection
would have triggered both internal and external.reactions; or the cancellation
of the November 1987 elections in Haiti, which occasioned a cut in aid but
little more; or the restoration of Aristide in 1994, which was not followed by
measures to restore the state as well; or the 1996 elections in Yugoslavia,
where the opposition received polite notice from Washington but no help.
More frequently, unscheduled events or crises invite an external
response. The 1995 shelling of Sarajevo galvanized the NATO allies into
intervention in Bosnial and the 1991 advances of the Eritrean and Tigrean
rebels on Addis Ababa brought in United States mediation.2 But neither the
1988 massacre of dispossessed Somali tribesmen in Hargeisa, the 1991 and
1993 military and civilian riots in Kinshasa and other Zairean cities, the 1995
and 1996 pogroms of targeted ethnic groups in the Kivus of eastern Zaire, the
1991 military coup against the elected Haitian government in Port au Prince,.
nor the 1994 unconstitutional installation of a new president in Haiti brought
any effective response. In an event-defined opportunity, scheduled or
unscheduled, the response must be immediate; otherwise, the opening closes
and the justification appears lame.
When there is no event, scheduled or unexpected, to require a response,
the opportunity is to be found more broadly in the context of the conflict.
Significantly, this is the more frequent case. The established model indicates
that a ripe moment for initiating mediation is composed of a mutually hurting
stalemate, out of which parties seek or are responsive to help in extricating
themselves. 3 Such a stalemate was seized on occasion-by the All-African
Council of Churches in 1972, when the southern and northern Sudanese
RICHARD HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR 91-93 (1998).
2 HERMAN J. COHEN, INTERVENING IN AFRICA: SUPERPOWER PEACEMAKING IN A
TROUBLED CONTINENT 17-59 (2000).
3 See generally I. William Zartman, The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third
World Conflicts, in MANAGING US-SOVIET RIVALRY 341 (Alexander L. George ed.,
1983); I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION (1989); I. William Zartman,
Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment, Formula, and Mediation, in PERSPECTIVES ON
NEGOTIATION 205 (Diane B. Bendahmane & John W. McDonald, Jr. eds., 1986); I.
William Zartman, Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond, in INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 225 (Paul Stem & Daniel Druckman eds.,
2000).
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armies bogged down in civil war;4 by the United States in 1987, when the
UNITA-South African and Cuban-Angolan armies checked each other at
Cuito Carnevale; 5 by Portugal in 1990, when the opposing forces in Angola
fought to an impasse at Mavinga;6 by Sant' Egidio and supporters in 1990,
when drought and destruction brought the Mozambican civil war to a
deadlock. 7
Parties to conflicts have repeatedly allowed ripe moments to slip away as
evidenced by the following: in Lebanon in March 1978, July 1982 and March
1984, factions engaged in a civil war were deadlocked and hurting but not
helped out of their impasse; in Liberia in June 1990, in April 1992 or July
1993, parties were brought to a ceasefire but no effective measures for
ending the conflict. Other instances when ripe moments for conflict
resolution were missed existed in June 1990 when the Yugoslav republics
were deadlocked over the future of the federation,, in October 1998 when the
Serbian government and the Kosovars were at an impasse over the Kosovo
issue, and in Somalia in March-June 1991 just after Siad Barre's fall. A
mutually hurting stalemate may motivate conflicting parties themselves to
negotiation but it is often the vehicle for third party intervention if the parties
are not motivated to seize the moment on their own. 8
But in some instances, there was only a soft stalemate with a painful but
bearable effect, and the interveners were required to create an event or an
opportunity to justify their action. 9 Intervention therefore had' to be sold to
the conflicting parties themselves (as well as to the interveners' public); it
was a lifebuoy thrown to a swimmer rather enjoying the excitement of the
surf and oblivious to the approaching tidal wave that was visible to the
thrower. The image shows that a soft stalemate requires third party
4 See HIZKIAs ASSEFA, MEDIATION OF CIVIL WARS 95-135 (1987).
5 See CHESTER A. CROCKER, HIGH NOON IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 353-72 (1992);
ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION supra note 3, at 170-254 (1989).
6 See Donald Rothchild & Caroline Hartzell, Interstate and Intrastate Negotiations
in Angola, in ELUSIVE PEACE 175, 190 (I. William Zartman ed., 1995).
7 See Ibrahim Msabaha, Negotiating an End to Mozambique's Murderous Rebellion,
in ELUSIVE PEACE, supra note 6, at 204, 221-27.
8 See generally Saadia Touval & William Zartman, International Mediation in the
Post-Cold War Era, in TURBULENT PEACE 427, 434-35 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds.,
2002).
9 See I. William Zartman, Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal
Conflicts, in ELUSIVE PEACE, supra note 6, at 3, 18-20; Msabaha, supra note 7, at 231,
231-35; Imtiaz H. Bakhari, International Negotiations Among Many Actors: Afghanistan,
in ELUSIVE PEACE, supra note 7, at 231, 231-35.
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intervention, even more than does a hard or hurting stalemate.' 0 In these
instances, the opportunity is artificial, to be constructed out of the unstable
conflict or impending collapse before it really blows up at a less convenient
time for both conflicting parties and vulnerable bystanders. "You're going to
be involved willy-nilly," noted Joseph Alpher of the Mideast conflict in
2001, "and so it is better to take the initiative than be dragged in by some
dramatic event, which.., is almost certainly going to be a negative one."'11
Finally, there are moments of opportunity when the conflict undergoes a
momentary calm, opening the possibility of creating a longer lasting, more
stable outcome. It is generally evident that measures are needed to make the
pause in the conflict permanent by addressing the causes of the conflict and
establishing mechanisms to prevent its reoccurrence.1 2 The opportunity may
come from an informal lull in the conflict, from a more explicit ceasefire, or
even from a meeting of the parties. The point is that it offers an opening for
specific measures for it is not self-perpetuating and will fall apart at the next
incident if not seized and solidified. In half the instances, third parties took
advantage of a momentary lull to summon the conflicting parties to a
conference to fill the political vacuum and reinstitute the state, but then failed
in reality because they did not invest commensurate energy in follow-
through.
In sum, the opportunity is defined as a moment in the conflict or collapse
when the external party can direct the conflicting parties' attention to
constructive measures. While there is a specific element in the identification
of opportunities-an event requiring a response, a stalemate impelling an
exit-there is also a huge window for creativity. Opportunities can be
inherently precise times or they can be broader time periods within which the
particular moment is a matter of perception and creation.
For this analysis, the focus for action is on a third party. 13 In the end,
domestic actors need to be brought back into control, but in state rebirth, as
in other delivery processes, midwiving is often necessary. It is true that the
parties to the conflict can also confront opportunities and miss them, but a
recipe for a different course of action would either have to enter their psyche,
where this analysis is not equipped to venture, or enlist a third party to make
the argument for change to them. That is where this analysis goes. The
objection may be raised that a new course of action for conflict resolution
10 See Zartman, supra note 9, at 10.
I I Lee Hockstader, US Role as Mideast Mediator Fades to a Whisper, WASH. POST,
Aug. 7, 2001, at A2.
12 NEGOTIATING FORWARD-AND-BACKWARD-LOOKING OUTCOMES (Viktor
Kremenyuk and 1. William Zartman eds., 2001).
13 But see BARBARA W..TUCHMAN, THE MARCH OF FOLLY (1984).
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must also enter a third party's psyche, where it is arguably disadvantaged
because it is removed from the arena of conflict. But entry into conflict
management through a third party is necessary to circumvent the major
problem of the arena, which is the clash between the psychological demands
of conflict and of its termination in the minds of the conflicting parties.
Parties at conflict need help. They are too taken up with the business of
conducting conflict to see the need and opportunities for a way out, unless
someone helps them. While conflicted states cannot be either saved by
reconstruction or saved from self-destruction by external action alone,
external intervention of some sort becomes necessary when conflict becomes
stuck in its own mire. Whether taken by one actor or several actors, action
must be coordinated, or collective mediation provides its own undoing.
Four criteria-minimal-rewrite, prior-mention, feasibility-relevance, and
contextual opportunity-have yielded thirty instances in the six cases where
an opportunity was arguably missed. The distribution of missed opportunities
is significant. It suggests that opportunities may come in bunches, after
which the chance for openings has passed, as in Zaire and Somalia.
Contrarily, it suggests that opportunities may come at intervals in the conflict
or the collapsing process, each slightly different and producing a new stage
of conflict and collapse, as in Lebanon, Haiti, and earlier Somalia. It also
suggests that missed opportunities can destroy the solution that was salient at
the time, so that good ideas can be worn out without even being tried, as in
the last days of Yugoslavia. Finally, it suggests that there are uninhabited
spaces in the evolution of the conflict or process of collapse when simply
nothing can be done, and that there were no opportunities to miss in Somalia
after the end of the US-UN intervention in 1993, in Congo (Zaire) during the
time of Laurent Kabila, or in Kosovo up to 1998.
Missed opportunities are not merely missed moments; they tend to be
failures to gain entry into a whole phase of a conflict, after which entry is no
longer or much more rarely possible, and the phase changes into something
less penetrable. Opportunities are not revolving doors, where entry appears at
regular intervals. They constitute a period of time in the life of the conflict
when preventive diplomacy is possible and after which entry becomes much
more difficult. Not only opportunities, but whole periods of opportunity were
missed in Yugoslavia, Liberia, Haiti, Somalia, and Zaire-Congo.
Consequently, these countries and their citizens, the regions, and the external




Need is not opportunity, but opportunity is not interest. For an
opportunity to be seized or missed, a third party must have an interest in
involvement. The enormous losses that missed opportunities entail, and their
effect on regional or global relations, provide a humanitarian interest in
intervention. Realists, to the contrary, would argue that humanitarian interest
is not a negligible concern for the United States. Whether in the Cold War or
in regional conflicts, states act to protect and advance their values, not just
their structural position. The importance of human life to the American
system of values gives humanitarian interest a special salience. As American
inaction on the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and official attempts to avoid the
"G-word" demonstrate, humanitarian interest and the value of human life
anywhere is not absolute, but it is strong. Joseph Nye has indicated that "[a]
democratic definition of the national interest does not accept the distinction
between a morality-based and an interest-based foreign policy. Moral values
are simply intangible interests," and British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook
has denied the distinction between "promoting our values [and] pursuing our
interests." 14
Incredibly, the fate of Lebanon, Somalia, Zaire, Yugoslavia, Liberia and
Haiti have, on crucial occasions, not been considered of interest to the United
States, Europe, or their own regions, nor has the importance of their
announced collapse to the fate of their region in general been deemed worthy
of motivating U.S., European or neighbors' involvement. If the loss of
500,000 Yugoslav lives, 500,000 Somalis, 150,000 Liberians, 120,000
Lebanese, 100,000 Zaireans, and 5,000 Haitians as a result of direct killings
at the hands of their own countrymen does not provide a compelling
humanitarian interest, it is not because these losses were not foreseeable and
foretold. If humanitarian interest was not enough motivation, the importance
of each case in regard to American and other Western foreign policy values
such as good governance, democracy, regional stability, economic
accountability and access, and external responsibility should have been.
But even for those who hold to the distinction between values and
interests, there is a national or strategic interest in managing deadly conflict
and state collapse. Collapsed states tend to be vacuums, drawing in outside
forces to fill the empty political space. That space is then occupied by
regional conflict, perpetuating the state collapse, exacerbating the domestic
14 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Human Rights and the National Interest:
A Different Kind of World Wide Web (Aug. 14, 2002), available at
http://www.lchr.org/itni.
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conflict, extending the regional conflict, and forcing extra-regional powers to
take sides against their interests. If the struggle to occupy the vacuum
engages neighbors in pursuit of their interests, it is broadly in the interest of
outside powers to see the collapsed state recover and take care of its own
affairs.
This argument is sometimes turned on its head to justify support for
dictators, who supposedly block the way to state collapse. But those who
proclaim "Mobutu or chaos" should remember "Apr~s moi le d6luge."'15 The
cited cases show that dictators cause state collapse, a finding that democrats
should find obvious. Finding stability in dictatorship is like the man who
jumped off the roof finding the going "so far, so good" at the 2 9 th floor; the
crash at the end is inevitable. The cases show that the argument that
measures to replace the dictator might have made things worse is specious: it
is hard to imagine consequences much worse than what happened.
External powers' generic interest in other areas is generally summarized
under the headings of stability and access. These elements are of particular
relevance to the United States because of the worldwide scope of its interests.
Undeniably, deadly conflict and state collapse impede commercial and
diplomatic access to a country and destroy its stability. While this defines a
general terrain for interest, it does not provide a finer screen to discriminate
between opportunities that justify action and those that do not. Three more
fine-meshed aspects of interest are responsibility, subsidiary, and
effectiveness.
Responsibility comes from the following three sources: history, ability,
and policy. The first two are structural, unchanged by whether a party
presently acts or not, whereas the third is dependent on recent action.
Responsibility also derives from the ability to affect events, whether
exercised or not, such as the responsibility that prompted parliamentary
inquiry in France and Belgium for inaction and complicity in the Rwandan
genocide (and was never pursued beyond the media in the United States,
which also had Rwandan blood on its hands). Policy responsibility derives
from previous actions related to the cause of the problem underlying the
conflict and collapse, such as U.S. responsibility in Zaire for having put
Mobutu in power and supported him ever since, or Syria's responsibility for
stability in Lebanon after its armed interventions.
Intervention to evacuate Doe in 1991 was turned down when Deputies
Meeting chair Robert Gates "refused to recognize any special [United States]
responsibility for Liberia's crisis on the basis of our historical ties," 16 or, as
15 Contra MICHAEL G. SCHATZBERG, MOBUTU OR CHAOS (1991).
16 COHEN, supra note 2, at 143. ,
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Secretary Baker put it in regard to Yugoslavia, "We don't have a dog in this
fight."'17 Although the judgment in both cases was shown by later events to
be flawed, they both illustrate the terms of interest involved. When Deputy
Secretary Eagleburger turned down proposals for evacuating Mobutu and
Doe because he did not want the United States to be responsible for the
unknown, he was doubtless aware of the U.S. responsibility for putting
Mobutu in power in 1965 and certifying Doe's election in 1985 in the first
place. But he missed the point that Africa and the world held the United
States responsible for the mess in Zaire and Liberia because it had the ability
to do something but did not. And when President George Bush allegedly said
that he did not want to be responsible for putting an escaped convict in
charge of Liberia, referring to Taylor, he was expressing the fear of
establishing an even firmer responsibility for Liberian events than already
existed. But the responsibility conferred by ability, especially when
reinforced by history and past policy, is hard to shake, and soon brought the
United States back into the fray with financial support for the Economic
Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), belying the
original judgment. In both cases, the United States was held responsible for
events, and found it indeed had a beaten dog in the fight.
Subsidiarity prioritizes different levels of responsibility. It indicates that
problems should be handled at the lowest effective level, and hence that
conflict and collapse should be dealt with first regionally before becoming a
global responsibility. Subsidiarity was found to be necessary to the workings
of the European Union and its spirit has permeated U.N. discussions.
"Yugoslavia is a European problem" and "African solutions for African
conflicts" are two expressions of subsidiary responsibility.
Subsidiarity is not without its own debate. While neighbors know the
territory better than foreigners, they also have their own interests which may
dictate solutions that are not necessarily in the best interest of the conflicted
country. Yet collective neighborhood attention, as opposed to single-state
intervention, spreads responsibility and tempers narrow interests.
Furthermore, subsidiarity has been challenged in the neighborhood as an
expression of outside neglect and disinterest-or irresponsibility--often in
the same breath as outside attention has been decried as external interference.
As in the matter of responsibility, subsidiarity is not self-interpreting; it only
indicates the terrain of debate in defining interest.
Effectiveness is the third element in interest, a point of prudence to
restrain the hell-bound best intentions. There is no point in opportunistic
17 Blaine Harden, The World: Rule of Force; In Africa, a Lesson in How Not to
Keep the Peace, N. Y. TIMES, May 14, 2000, § 4, at 1.
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intervention if the intervenor does not have the necessary resources or if the
intervention will be obdurately refused. For this reason, ripeness is included
in the identification of an opportunity; there is no point in leading the horse
to water if it absolutely is not thirsty. Effectiveness, too, is a function of
effort deployed; some of the most prominent reasons for the ineffectiveness
of attempts to use opportunities are shortsighted satisfaction with superficial
results, weariness before sustained effort, and unwillingness to stay engaged.
Effectiveness cannot be taken as a counsel of perfection. The notion, at
the heart of PDD 25 and subsequent US peacekeeping engagements, that
there must be an effective ceasefire before monitoring missions can be
undertaken raises the bar of effectiveness unrealistically high and contributes
to the cowardly reputation of the putative King of the Jungle. In a world of
internal conflict with disorganized rebel groups and ineffective governments,
a peace-enforcement mission and rules of engagement are necessary
components of peacekeeping; thinking otherwise is to continue to operate in
a bygone world of functioning states making ceasefires with their sovereign
authority.
The debate on the advisability of seizing the proposed opportunities is a
matter of judgment; it is that judgment which is questioned here. In many
cases, the soundness of the judgment was denied by events themselves-by
subsequent reruns of the debates which ended in attempts to seize an
opportunity that had already passed. Thus, the weight of history in the middle
run frequently overrides the authority of history in the short run, when it tries
to assert that the judgments of the time were sound appreciations of the only
way to proceed. As history shows, opportunities were missed according to
the very criteria by which they were turned down; the parties showed bad
judgment on the basis of their own criteria. Delay caused the actions of
external powers to be made under less favorable circumstances with greater
effort and less effect, in Yugoslavia, Haiti, Liberia, Lebanon, and Somalia.
Delay also foreclosed certain courses of action for external parties in Zaire.
IV. EARLY AWARENESS AND EARLY ACTION
The strongest reason for early action, when options are still available, is
that later action is more expensive, forced and constrained; inaction is costly
in its consequences. In all of the cases, the US-to focus on the leading
country-was obliged to enter the conflict late, after having avoided chances
to take lesser action earlier. When it finally adopted a policy, substantial
damage had already been done. Many of the deaths and displacements were
accompanied by frightful human abuses-rapes, massacres, destruction of
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homes and places of worship, and other brutalities. These are some of the
costs that need to be calculated in making the decision not to act.
These losses had even greater secondary effects. Socially and
psychologically, they left deeply scarred and wounded people. Groups who
had been mobilized by memories of past atrocities were wounded by new
carnage committed by individuals currently living among or beside their
victims. Turks, Ustashe, Tonton Macouts, Hutu and Tutsi, Banyarwanda,
Ogadenis-Marehans-Dulbahantes, Krahns, Gios and Manos, and others
stepped out of history and confirmed the sometimes dim and distant myths of
the past. Reconciliation became an additional burden for the conflict
resolution process, justice vied with peace, and trust and cooperation lay
dead with the victims.
Society was also shattered by the conflict. Population displacement
destroyed the social tissue, traditional norms of respect and authority were
trashed, and social institutions such as church and school were left in ruins.
Social geography, patterns, and structures were seriously altered in generally
unproductive and antagonistic ways; societies generally underwent leveling
and proletarianizing, with massive influxes into the cities. The new
leadership tended to appeal to, be representative of, and derive its support
from this new social sector. The youth suffered tremendously in all of the
countries, with heavy implications for the future. Education was interrupted,
unemployment became endemic, drugs took hold, and child soldiers were
scarred in their formative years. This is not just a litany of the evil effects of
civil strife; it is a specific list of social dislocations resulting from a conflict
left to run its course, through missed opportunities for its management.
Furthermore, the conflicts destroyed national as well as personal
economies. It was not simply that some buildings were destroyed and needed
rebuilding, or that some people lost their jobs or even savings. The entire
national economic systems of the six countries were demolished. Haiti was
set back decades, denuded of its industry and topsoil. 18 Reconstruction in
Lebanon was estimated at $45 billion for the years 1977, 1983, and the 1990s
alone. 19 Liberia's GDP growth has been consistently negative since the
arrival of Doe to power, which accounts for Taylor's reliance on his diamond
18 Kumar, Chetan, Peacebuilding in Haiti, in PEACEBUILDING AS POLITICS 21, 21-52
(Elizabeth Cousnes & Chetan Kumar eds., NY International Peace Academy, 2001).
19 The only years for which figures are available; figures from the Lebanese Council
for Development and Reconstruction and the Arab Development Fund; SALIM NASR,
GEORGE IRANI AND JAMES SAMS, WORKING PAPER CONFERENCE ON LEBANON, 97-98
(American Task Force on Lebanon ed., Washington D.C. 1991).
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habit.20 Zaire's formal economy virtually collapsed during the same period;
the remaining part of its infrastructure that had not disintegrated from
mismanagement and neglect was destroyed in the riots of the early 1990s,
and anything left or added since was again demolished in the civil wars of
1996-97 and 1998-2002.2 1 While the prosperous parts of Yugoslavia hived
off in the early 1990s, secluding the nation's wealth, the rest of the former
republic has continued to disintegrate. 22 Somalia, never well off, has simply
returned to subsistence.23 The countries, which were originally poor, became
even more miserable.
Normally the list of costs stops here, or earlier, but the collapse of a third
sector-the political sector-also bears heavy consequences. 24 When the
state is privatized, as in Zaire/Congo and Liberia, or pulverized, as in
Somalia, or drawn and quartered, as in Yugoslavia, or contested, as in
Lebanon, or hijacked, as in Haiti,. it loses its legitimacy as well as its ability
to function. Collapsed states are not simply rebuilt like a fallen statehouse
portico; they need reconstruction from the foundations. Not only is it a long
and complex job, but it is also a void that foreign forces and international
institutions cannot adequately fill. The rapacious practices of Milosevic,
Duvalier, Siad Barre, Mobutu and Doe made it hard to find successors with a
civic spirit and sense of government. There is no one to conduct business as
usual during remodeling. The problem with state reconstruction-unlike
economic and even social reconstruction-is not state reconstruction per se,
but that there is no state to hold activities together while reconstruction is
going on.
But the final element of cost was for the reluctant intervenor. The
argument is usually made that the loss of 216 Marines in Lebanon in 1982, or
18 Rangers and special forces in Somalia in 1993, or the threatened danger to
the policemen aboard the Harlan County in 1993 and to the Troika's troops
offshore from Kinshasa in 1991 and 1993, demonstrate the cost of
intervention and provide proof of its inadvisability. However, that argument
is upside down. These costs show the need for even earlier preventative
action.
In all of these cases, not only was it expensive to delay effective action in
the conflict, it became impossible later to avoid involvement, with further
20 WILLIAM RENO, WARLORD POLITICS AND AFRICAN STATES 79-113 (Lynne
Reinner ed., Boulder 1998).
21 Id. at 147-55, 174-76.
22 SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY (1995).
23 LEARNING FROM SOMALIA (Walter Clarke & Jeffrey Herbst eds., 1997).
24 1. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, COLLAPSED STATES (1995).
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expensive consequences. After the U.S. had dithered through the evolving
Yugoslav disintegration in the early 1990s, it was unavoidably drawn in to
handle the consequences in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia in the second
half of the decade. After the U.S. pursued its contradictory appreciations of
the Haitian crisis in the early 1990s, it was finally obliged to use full force in
the middle of the decade; the U.S. declared victory and went back home. The
U.S. and its Troika partners found themselves obliged to reckon with an
intransigent, paranoid successor in dealing with Kabila's Congo after they
avoided decisive measures at the beginning and into the middle of the 1990s
in dealing with Mobutu's Zaire. The international community felt compelled
to engage in truly shocking events in the successor situation after it had only
looked on with shock at the final paroxysms of Siad Barre's regime-as the
anguished discussions at the end of the Bush and the beginning of the Clinton
administrations demonstrate. 25 If external actors had continued to ignore
these conflicts and collapses indefinitely, then the missed opportunities
would only be humanitarian losses. But because the United States and other
outside players eventually feel obliged to get involved when the situation is
worse, early engagement becomes a matter of interest.
V. EXCUSES
In all thirty instances of missed opportunities in the six collapsing states,
early warnings were more than adequate, proposed measures would likely
have been successful, and the cost of collapse in terms of lives and money
may have been much less than the final actual costs. In half the instances, the
policy proposals involve merely strengthening initiatives that have already
been taken. So why were the opportunities missed?
The most specific reason is that the measures were contrary to the policy
supporting the status quo, even as the status quo was falling apart. The
United States long held to the policy of "Mobutu or Chaos" and the whole
Troika worked hard to make that mantra come true.26 Like Mobutu, Doe was
long viewed as a bulwark against communism, and his regime's assistance in
giving the United States a toehold in West Africa was viewed with gratitude.
In Haiti, U.S. policy and opinion was sharply divided between supporters of
Haitian business and advocates of Haitian populist democracy; this dulled the
thrust of any effort to secure a rapid return of President Aristide. Thus, in
25 Maryann Cusimano, Operation Restore Hope: The Bush Administration's
Decision to Intervene in Somalia (Georgetown University: Pew Case Studies).
26 SCHATZBERG, supra note 15; Lisa Pachter, Our Man in Kinshasa (1987)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University) (on file with The Johns
Hopkins University).
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many cases, the safe status quo was preferred to risky change and as a
consequence, these states continued to slide down the slippery slope toward
collapse. A well-crafted alternative that reduces risk and follows through
with supports and controls is needed to counter the costly policy favoring the
status quo.
Another reason opportunities were missed was a fear of casualties. The
official fear of military deaths was encouraged by the Bush administration as
early as 1991 by the manner the Gulf War was touted; the fear was then
played to the hilt by the Clinton administration. Instead of developing such
themes as leadership, post-Cold War order, U.N. usefulness to American
objectives, regional security regimes, protection of human rights, and values
as interest, the United States, joined by other Western countries, hid behind
its own rhetoric about casualties even when the danger of deaths was
minimal. As a result, it allowed forces of disorder and spirals of violence to
prove its point. A little exemplary firmness in Liberia, Somalia, and
Yugoslavia in 1990 or in Liberia, Somalia, Zaire, Yugoslavia, and Haiti in
1991 would have involved few or no troops and would have forestalled much
larger troop use and danger later. The absence of such a response showed the
forces of disorder in these countries that their actions were unchecked. Thus,
a firm response not only inhibits specific disorder in the short run, but it also
inhibits its escalation in the long run.
A third reason for the missed opportunities was a lack of mediation
skills. Frequently, as in Lebanon, Liberia, and Somalia, mediation was
attempted but failed because it was not well conducted. There were no skilled
authoritative mediators, often because of a shortage of experience and
training in the tough business of preventive diplomacy (especially in West
Africa and the Middle East). Keeping the parties engaged, devising trade-
offs, thinking through consequences and follow-through, working out details,
installing dispute-resolution mechanisms, developing ties and relationships,
were skills, which were absent in crucial conferences of the parties. Provision
of a skilled mediator was required to complement the demarche.
Inhibitions also derived from Cold War considerations in. the late 1980s
and Gulf War concerns in the early 1990s. But usually Cold War inhibitions
on the U.S. side were the result of a bogus calculation. Support and
participation in the Damascus and Lausanne negotiations would have left the
United States in a stronger position in the Middle East, particularly with
Syria, which was claimed as an ally by the Soviet Union, but also with Saudi
Arabia, Muslims, and Christians in Lebanon. The idea that Doe and Barre
were bulwarks against communism in Africa, which was invoked to inhibit
preventive diplomacy in 1985 and 1988, respectively, is farfetched especially
in light of the fact that neither of their oppositions were communist.
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The Gulf War blocked U.S. and U.N. attention to a number of promising
demarches in two major directions. It monopolized official attentions,
leaving no space for dealing with other issues, and it dominated the
possibilities of building alliances and coalitions in 1991, since the United
States was already too deeply in political debt to its allies on the Gulf front to
be able to contract additional debts on other issues. Yet, the judgment that the
United States can only handle one crisis at a time is simply not true in the
absolute, since the United States has frequently been called on to deal with
"two front" diplomacy.27 Yet, these very considerations should have worked
in the other direction. Given that the proposed preventive diplomacy
demarches were not of crisis magnitude, authority to deal with them should
have been delegated and they should have been handled, with support from
the Assistant Secretary and Regional Bureau level, before they became
crises. 28
VI. FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
In the last analysis, the major reasons for missed opportunities lie at the
feet of some of the leading tenets of conflict management in the post-Cold
War era. These reasons include a paralyzing worry over mission creep, a
fixation on exit strategy, a fear of military engagement and casualties, an
aversion to "nation-building," and most broadly, an unwillingness to bear the
responsibilities of international leadership in the post-Cold War era. These
policies and attitudes have hampered effective action and allowed
opportunities to slip away in blood, only to reappear as impositions at times
when it is most difficult to adhere to them.
The impending baggage begins with the fear of mission creep, which is
derived from the inability to foresee the needs of the mission and to prepare
for it adequately. Mission creep is indeed a real danger-a form of the
serious problem of entrapment;29 of course mission creep is not advocated
here, but instead appropriate mission preparation to avoid it. Mission creep is
the result of poor planning-of not taking adequate measures to handle the
problem initially and of not understanding the potential for escalation if this
is not done; it is not the result of surprises during the mission. The following
are examples of the many ways in which shortsighted plans create their own
27 Fareed Zakaria, The Superpower that Couldn't Say No, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
1999, § 4, at 17.
28 See CHESTER A. CROCKER, HIGH NOON IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 465-82 (1992).
29 See JOEL BROCKNER & JEFFERY Z. RUBIN, ENTRAPMENT IN ESCALATING
CONFLICTS (1985); Paul Meerts, Escalation and Entrapment, in ESCALATION AND
NEGOTIATION (I. William Zartman & Guy Olivier Faure eds., 2003).
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pressure for either embarrassing entrapment or shame-faced withdrawal:
sending in peacekeeping missions when peace-enforcing missions are
required, setting up rules of engagement inappropriate to the announced task
of disarmament or relief delivery, conceiving of ceasefire as the end of the
mission when sustained engagement is necessary, believing that restoration
or election of a president is the end of the state-building process.
Exit strategies, too, are necessary. But when they become the criterion
for the success of action, rather than its reward, they mistake the prize for the
race; one does not do a job to go home, but instead gets to go home after
having done the job. The problem returns to a definition of the job and a
realization that maintaining security takes more than six months in Bosnia or
thirty days in Macedonia, and that is well known ahead of time. 30
Trumpeting the exit strategy and the withdrawal date before the operation
begins not only encourages the combatants to hide their arms until the
intervention times expire, but also trains the public to expect early
disengagement. In addition, it trains the public all over again to distrust their
political leaders when they make such untenable promises. All that is well at
inception.
The pressure for exit strategies is an overreaction to two reasonable
problems. Again, one is the fear of entrapment. There is an understandable
concern that it always appears to require more time to finish the job. The
other is the historic record, as in the two decades of earlier U.S. occupation
of Haiti (1915-1934) that the Haitians have not forgotten, that demonstrates
to the difficulty of extracting forces originally installed to overcome disorder.
Such concerns are healthy. But, they can be taken into account without
overreaction. The guideline should be "stay as long as you must, leave as
soon as you can." At the bottom of it all, overcoming conflict and rebuilding
authority are responsibilities of the people involved and cannot be
accomplished by outsiders. Too much directive outside presence is quickly
resented and counterproductive-a uniting cause for resistance to the
intervenor's best intentions. The exact line between "can" and "must" will
vary in each case, but judgment errs when only one of the limits is used as
the criterion.
Similarly, the fear of bodybags as a criterion for engagement mistakes a
legitimate concern for a predominant guideline; it has also made the U.S.
military an object of derision and a threat of silk. The lesson of Somalia for
the United States was one of non-engagement, but the lesson of Somalia
abroad was that the U.S. military can easily be defeated because a few




casualties will cause it to withdraw. That is a sad state indeed. Yet, the
attitude has been consistently instilled and propagated, not just by the
military, but also by the concerns of political leaders for protecting U.S.
soldiers rather than U.S. interests. Political leaders have not been articulate in
showing how the proliferation of anarchic orders in East, West and Central
Africa, in the Caribbean and the Andes, and in the Balkans, the Caucasus,
and the Levant creates a world that is not in the United States' best interest.
Anarchy spreads, not because some people are not "civilized" or suffer
"primordial conflicts," or because its forces are too powerful, but because
legitimate order is not defended. Such defense will entail bodybags on
occasion, but those who fill them need an inspiring justification from their
political leaders that ending deadly conflict and preventing state collapse is a
worthy task in the interest of their country.
The final misplaced criterion is the aversion to "nation-building." 31 The
problem is so badly misconceived that its authors do not even know what
their term means; national-building is a longstanding concept referring to the
creation of a single object of identification and allegiance out of component
social groups, or turning traditional societies into modem nations. 32 Although
foreign mediators and intervenors can undertake actions that contribute to
building national identity as a final goal, it is rather difficult for them to take
on directly the essentially domestic work of building a nation. What they can
and must help do is to build the state, the institutions, functions, and
authorities on which local efforts can then develop a sense of belonging and
ownership as they rebuild their nation.
Themost important lesson of this exercise is that conflict management
requires state-building, and that thinking of one without the other is
condemning the prevention of deadly conflict to futility. It is impossible to
call a truce to deadly disorder and expect it to hold without engaging in the
process of restoring order. To overcome the destructive effects of conflict
and the ruins of collapse, states need focused and sustained attention,
otherwise the conflict will burst forth again, building on the bitterness, blood
and penury that its earlier round created. 33 Internal war ceasefires are not the
same as interstate truces; they are not made between ongoing, functioning
agencies that can apply the agreements' provisions while running their own
affairs, but they are made between weak, exhausted, wounded parties without
31 See generally NATION-BUILDING (KaH W. Deutsch & William J. Foltz eds.,
1963).
32 See generally id.; Fred W. Riggs, The Theory of Political Development, in
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ANALYSIS 317 (James C. Charlesworth ed., 1967).
33 Paul Collier, Risk and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, paper presented to the
International Studies Association, 2001.
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the power or authority to monitor their own implementations. For conflict-4
management devices to Work, the states must be restored.
Once they are given their start, states can grow into their functions-a
growth that has no determined final nature or fixed limit. But, their start, or
re-start, needs assistance. The parties emerging from conflict and collapse do
not take over functioning structures, reliable institutions, working
bureaucracies, or recognized authorities. The very purpose of the civil
conflict is to destroy the authority' of the state; when the conflict ends, by
convocation or by deposition, that authority needs to be restored, confidence
rebuilt, output revived, and the causes and effects of conflict erased. Leaving
all this to the unassisted parties 'is like asking the sick and wounded person to
cure himself.
Specifically, this means that the ceasefire must be monitored with muscle
and re-mediated when infractions and interpretations reappear. Combatant
disarmament and demobilization efforts must be organized and conducted.
Individuals must be rehabilitated and economies will need reconstruction. A
national army must be recruited out of the various combatant groups,
retrained, and given reliable command structures. Local councils must be
established under appropriate rules of selection, and must involve civil
society and traditional leaders as well as the local combatants' leaders. From
these groups, national representative institutions need to be built and filled,
and national executive leadership chosen. A police system must be installed.
The education system needs quick restoration, which will require local
consumer participation, staff replenishment, security assurance, and the
location of materials and buildings. Finally, it is very important that all this
be done at once, and yet there is no one in charge and capacitated to do it.
Certainly the new political forces within the conflict area are the primary
participants in this process, and may even be nominally in charge. But their
capacities are lame and limited 'by the preceding struggle, and they need
assistance from an external party to enforce the rules, provide technical
capacity, ensure security, supervise reconciliation, jump-start initiatives, give
training, and provide resources.
The great American tendency to wait until the mess in a foreign arena is
beyond the capacities of local entities, to set it straight in short order and then
go back home, is shortsighted and outmoded. The United States showed that
it learned this lesson en gros in its shift of attitude from the League of
Nations after World War I to the United Nations after World War II. But it
has not learned the lesson in detail or in specific applications. Even its
attitude toward the U.N. is one of suspicion and underutilization. If deadly
conflict and state collapse are going to compel U.S. attention in extremis,
they must also compel both preventive regenerative attention. That means
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that the U.S. must pay attention to the reinstatement of a state apparatus, and
ensure that it functions well enough to keep the conflict managed, is capable
of moving the conflict toward resolution, and prevent its reemergence.
The major reasons for missed opportunities also lie at the feet of some of
the leading tenets in the study of international relations, which in turn
influence policymakers' , thinking on what' is possible and desirable.
International relations theory is torn between the realist notions of state
supremacy and the liberal and constructivist assumptions that the state is
increasingly bypassed by, a multitude of other actors. To the first, perhaps
paradoxically, what is not a state does not matter, and to some, what is not a
great power does not matter at all. 34 The need to construct and support
legitimate authority in the softer areas of the globe where it does not exist is
not considered important to the interest of the major states. The liberals and
constructivists do not do much better.
In its focus on relative gains, international relations theory, in its
dominant realist expression, lends credence to the notion that State collapse
and deadly conflict are of interest only to the extent that they affect the
competitive standing of the major states vis-A-vis each other.35 From this
point of view, support for the debilitating regimes of Doe, Siad Barre, and
Mobutu was important to the United States to the extent that it kept out
Soviet (and Libyan) influence. Yugoslavia likewise mattered as long as it
could be kept out of the Soviet sphere. A State Department official justified
support for Doe in the 1985 elections by saying, "We gained five years of
support in the Cold War."'36 When the Cold War passed, this justification for
major state interest passed with it. The end of the Cold War is history, but the
legacy it leaves of relative gains deprives conflict control and state
restoration of an argument for policymakers attention.
Relative gains thinking blocked conflict resolution and the restoration of
target states in a number of instances including the following: the Fashoda
Complex which inhibited French and American cooperation in Zaire and
Rwanda, the rivalry between Nigeria and Francophile states over Liberia, the
competition for influence between Ethiopia and Egypt over Somalia, the
rivalry among the E.C. members over their relative position within the
Community and vis-i-vis successor republics of Yugoslavia, 37 the strident
34 KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 72 (1979).
35 See generally Robert Powell, Absolute and Relative Gains in International
Relations Theory, AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1303 (1991).
36 Confidential interview.
37See generally MICHAEL LIBAL, LIMITS OF PERSUASION (1997); HENRY
WYNAENDTS, L'ENGRENAGE (Paris: Denoel, 1993).
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confrontation between India ind Pakistan, and the- Arab Cold War38 and the
Arab-Israeli hot wars over Lebanon. Yet, that resolution and restoration was
not in the interest of the blocked states, who were prevented from moving
forward in constructive, collective, and evenhanded involvement by the habit
of looking over their shoulder at their rivals. International relations theory
gives bad advice in taking poor practice for the norm.
The most serious sources of error in international relations theory lie in
its weak database. By assuming that what states did is what they will do, it
mistakes human choice for scientific input, individual errors for structured
determinations, and good or bad decisions for the only decisions possible.
Under this view, there are no missed opportunities because state behavior is
determined by databased laws. There are a number of examples of state
actions that can neither be explained, nor prescriptively analyzed, by this
approach, including the U.S. vote on the League of Nations compared with
its vote on the U.N., the sides in the debate over NATO enlargement, the
failure of the 2000 Camp David mediation between Israel and Palestine, and
the repeated failures compared to the ultimate but tardy success of attempts
to end the Liberian, Lebanese, Haitian, Mozambican, or Bosnian civil wars.
Results are presented as regularities derived from the observation of
scientific data, engendering recommendations that the military is the only
source of power, relative gains are the only motivation, states are impelled by
a drive for power, norms and institutions have no impact on state actions, and
values have no role in determining vital interests. Armed with such notions,
decision makers feel justified in pursuing narrow understandings of their own
possibilities and responsibilities. It is necessary to separate what states do
badly from what they do well and to study their decision moments, in order
to understand and improve the behavior of statesmen and to learn from their
missed opportunities.
But to take advantage of these lessons, political leaders must shed the
baggage of the current era which has prevented them from taking timely,
decisive action and has left them vulnerable to inescapable pressures to act
later when the costs and victims have already accumulated. The United
States has been the biggest cowardly lion, although other states' leaders,
most notably Europeans, also show the same symptoms at times. The United
States has the means to act and the responsibility to do so as "the last
remaining superpower." It is that responsibility which must be emphasized.
The United States led the "Free World Coalition" in the Cold War for a
purpose, not simply as a structural obligation to stop a threatening hegemon.
38 See generally MALCOLM H. KERR, THE ARAB COLD WAR (1967); PATRICK SEALE,
THE STRUGGLE FOR SYRIA (1965).
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That purpose was to protect and advance a world comprised of states that are
free of repression and able to function in ways that enhance the well being of
their citizens. These simple goals are what makes action in extremis
undesirable and what makes early action the wisest course. In the last
analysis, early action is the wisest course because action in extremis would
ultimately be unavoidable due to the role expectations that American values
impose on U.S. international action.39
39 It may be argued that action in extremis is avoidable, as Rwanda shows. But it is
avoidable only at enormous embarrassment and with shamefaced apologies afterward,
and all testimony-whatever their sincerity and effectiveness-to the strength of the
expectations. As to their sincerity, see I. William Zartman, An Apology Needs a Pledge,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at A25.
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APPENDIX
Thirty Instances in Six Cases of Missed Opportunities
Lebanon Civil War and State Collapse 1976-84
l.a. January 1976: Militia stalemate and Arab League concern provided
an occasion to broaden a Syrian initiative and reinforce the announced
Constitutional Document while the civil conflict was still in the hands of
civilian politicians.
1.b.November 1979: Withdrawals of external forces, weaknesses in
militia leadership, and attempts at internal reform opened a potentiality for
coordinated Arab and Lebanese efforts to restore the Lebanese polity.
1.c. July-August 1982: The new unstable situation created by the Israeli
invasion of Lebanon provided the opportunity for a different Reagan
Initiative that focused on the Lebanese problem, brought in Syria, and
worked more deliberately on an internal peace agreement.
1.d.March 1984: Reconciliation sessions at Geneva and Lausanne
offered the opportunity for Saudi and American participation along with
Syria to add participants, incentives and guarantees to the Lausanne
Agreement.
Liberian State Collapse and Civil War 1985-93 and Sierra Leonean
Spillover 1998
2.a. October 1985: Fraudulent electoral results after a U.S. warning
provided the opportunity for U.S. decertification and support of the true
count to end Doe's regime at a time when political forces were still intact and
the army not cleansed of anti-Doe forces.
2.b. June 1990: A pause in the fighting and U.S. contacts with both sides
provided an opportunity for U.S. evacuation of Samuel Doe to safe
retirement in Nigeria or Togo while Charles Taylor held off his attack on
Monrovia, thus offering an occasion for influence with Taylor's National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).
2.c. April-July 1992: A holding ceasefire and an advancing mediation
initiative offered the opportunity for inclusion of all factions and stronger
mediation role for the Carter Center's International Negotiation Network to
provide fuller implementing details and a more realistic monitored
disarmament for the Yamoussoukro IV peace agreement.
2.d.July 1993: A new stalemate following intense fighting and a new
framework agreement opened the opportunity for the Carter Center
International Negotiation Network (INN) and the U.N. Special
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Representative of the Secretary General (S.R.S.G.) to mediate a realistic
disarmament and interim governance agreement.
2.e. July 1998: A stalemate and rainy season lull in the fighting in Sierra
Leone, marked by a presidential, agreement between Sierra Leone and
Liberia, gave an opportunity to redeploy of an augmented Economic
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) force
along the common border and the diamond areas of Sierra Leone.
Somali State Collapse 1988-93
3.a. October 1988: The Hargeisa massacre provided an opportunity for
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Organization of African Unity
(OAU) and Intergovernmental Agency on Drought and Development
(IGADD) condemnation, mediation of monitored ceasefire, and convocation
of national reconciliation conference under US-USSR leadership.
3.b.May 1990-January 1991: The call for a sovereign national
conference (as practiced elsewhere in Africa) constituted an opportunity for
US-Soviet-IGADD mediation of Siad Barre's resignation (such as the United
States arranged for Mengistu in March 199 1) and leadership transition.
3.c. March-June 1991: Ceasefire and a partial conference at Djibouti
offered the possibility of success if complemented by earlier UNSC
authorization of UNOSOM I with an arms embargo and a more inclusive
Djibouti participation.
3.d. March 1992: A new ceasefire opened the opportunity for rapid
UNSC authorization of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping monitors
with extended rules of engagement, confidence-building measures and a
reconciliation conference, with a broadened mandate for U.N. mediator
Mohamed Sahnoun.
3.e. March 1993: The transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM I1 required
a continuation of UNITAF policies of grassroots institutionalization,
agreement enforcement and policing.
3.f. October 1993: The confrontation between the militias and the Delta
Force was the opportunity for a firm reaction by U.S. forces in Somalia to
deaths at the Aideed corral.
Zairean State Collapse 1991-96
4.a. September 1991: Soldier and civilian riots brought French and
Belgian troops to Kinshasa, providing an opportunity to bring Mobutu to
hand power to the Sovereign National Conference.
4.b.January-February 1993: Soldier and civilian riots brought French
troops to Kinshasa, and the killing of the French ambassador provided an
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opportunity to bring Mobutu to hand power to the Sovereign National
Conference or to arrest him when he went to France for dental treatment.
4.c. September 1993-January 1994: A number of occasions on the
diplomatic and internal Zairean level offered opportunities for U.S.
mediation of governmental reform.
4.d. July 1995: Warnings of pogroms in Masisi provided an opportunity
for an international effort to halt ethnic violence and move and disarm
Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire.
4.e. March 1996: Renewed warnings of pogroms against another the
Banyamulenge provided a last opportunity for the UN, the OAU and the
Carter Center to mediate to protect the population.
Yugoslav State Collapse 1989-98
5.a. October 1989-March 1990: Croatian, Slovenian, and Serbian
insistence on maintaining a (con)federal Yugoslavia provides the opportunity
for an international conference under US/EC and Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) auspices to work out a satisfactory solution
and provide economic support.
5.b. March-July 1991: Impending threat of independence provided the
occasion for EC reaffirmation of minority rights conditions for recognition of
Croatia and insistence on (con)federal Yugoslavia, with U.S. support within
CSCE.
5.c. & d. February-March 1992 and January 1993: U.N. & E.C.
d6marches, the Cutiliero and Vance-Owens plans, were successive
opportunities for United States and EC to guarantee Bosnian integrity.
5.e. September-November 1996: Dayton agreements provided an
opportunity to enforce standards on democracy and ethnic treatment that
would help prevent violence in Kosovo.
5.f. October 1998: Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and NATO pressure
created an opportunity only half-way pursued for meaningful negotiations
between the Kosovar and Milosevic on a transitional status for Kosovo.
Haitian State Collapse 1991-96
6.a. October-December 1991: OAS sanctions offered an opportunity for
UNSC support and negotiation of coup's reversal, and for tightening of the
sanctions during the Cartegena meeting to reverse Aristide's overthrow.
6.b. January-February 1992, OAS mediation gave an opportunity for
complementary pressure on Dominican Republic to close borders and
enforce sanctions to force the junta to withdraw.
6.c. August-October 1993: The Governor's Island agreement provided
the opportunity for a conclusive action through maintenance of the sanctions
[Vol118:1 20021
COWARDLY LIONS
and insistence on the Harlan County's landing and observance of the
Agreement.
6.d.January-July 1996: Maintenance of the constitutional rules for
succession opened a last opportunity for a US-led dialog program among
government, parties, business, and civic groups to create momentum toward
reconstruction programs.
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